Proactive project – Recommendations on how to adapt SOPs and tools, 2021

Executive summary
Deliverable 2.4 is part of the second Work Package of project PROACTIVE that focuses on the
engagement of Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) and other Practitioners. This deliverable presents
an analysis of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
Nuclear & explosive (CBRNe) incidents which are important for a successful coordinated response
to CBRNe threats.
The analysis covers relevant topics related to taking evidence (e.g. hazard detection and location,
threat assessment, sampling plan, identification of CBRN agents, decontamination, scene
management, victim care and victim management). A special focus of analysis of SOPs was on crisis
communication since communication is as a key element in CBRNe threats and incidents, including
both communication towards and among first responders, and communication with the public,
including vulnerable citizens, and the media.
The biggest challenge of analysis was direct access to SOPs (especially those employed by Police
Authorities) as they were mostly reported as classified or for internal use only even from some of the
project partnersâ countries. This issue was addressed in two ways. The model of coordinated
response to CBRNe threats was built on: 1) the resources provided to the project by LEA partners
for review and amendment, and 2) the analysis of CBRNe SOPs collected though a survey which
was held through an online platform together with a Practitioner Stakeholder Advisory Board (PSAB)
workshop using a polling methodology. The information from publicly available sources like
guidelines and instruction tools were considered to complete the response process picture.
The report presents different aspects of the response process and describes commonalities and
differences found in available sources, the information reported in the online survey about CBRNe
SOPs and information collected through the PSAB workshop poll. Special emphasis was put on
identification of preparedness to handle affected vulnerable citizens during CBRNe incidents.
The conclusion chapter includes a set of key practical recommendations. These will be further used
in the PROACTIVE joint exercises and some of them have the potential of being further implemented
in CBRNe SOPs. Many of these key recommendations touch upon the involvement of vulnerable
groups in the process of preparedness, including communication strategies with citizens with
different types of impairment.


